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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides a federal
income tax deduction for "a contribution or gift to or for the use or"
organizations described in section 170(c) of the Code.2 Although the
charitable contribution deduction has existed since the War Revenue Act
of 1917,' the nature of contributions or gifts that qualify for the deduction
is the subject of much litigation and uncertainty. It is clear that a donor will
receive a deduction under section 170 if he contributes to a charitable
organization, receives no substantial or direct benefit in return for the
contribution, and retains no interest in the contributed property other than
as a member of the general public.4 Two issues arise, however, when a
donor receives a direct or substantial benefit that is not received by the
general public: first, whether any charitable deduction is allowable; and,
second, if a deduction is allowable, how it is to be measured.5 These issues
have not been satisfactorily resolved by the courts or the Internal Revenue
Service. The courts have adopted three apparently inconsistent analyses to
decide whether a deduction is allowable and, if so, the amount of the
* Associate Dean and Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Law
1. The terms "contribution or gift" have been held to be synonymous. DeJong v. Commissioner,
309 F.2d 373, 376-77 (9th Cir. 1962); Channing v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 33, 34 (D. Mass. 1933),
affd, 67 F.2d 986 (1st Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 686 (1934). It is not clear why both terms are
used. See Eliasberg, Section 170: Recent Developments on the "What," "When" and "How Much" of
Charitable Giving, 44 TAXES 418, 419 n.7 (1966).
2. bection 170(c) describes federal, state and local governments, religious, charitable, scientific,
literary or educational organizations, and organizations that foster amateur sports competition. In
addition, deductible charitable contributions may be made to some war veterans organizations and
some cemetery companies. The organizations described in § 170(c) are, with some exceptions, the same
as those that are exempt from income taxation under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
3. Ch. 63, title XII, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300 (1919). See note 9 infra, and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-323, 1979-2 C.B. 106. In this Revenue Ruling the Internal Revenue
Service held that contributions to an industrial commission were deductible because "there is no
indication that gifts to the commission will inure to the benefit of private interests except indirectly in
the course of advancing the public purposes of promoting the economic health and stability of the
area." Id. at 107. Other examples of incidental benefits are the generalbenefits the public receives from
a hospital that provides improved health care to the community because of contributions to it or the
general benefits to the public of improved education that result from contributions to colleges. See,
generally Sutton v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 239 (1971); Citizens and S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 243
F. Supp. 900 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
5. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, for example, deals with various situations where a donor
receives benefits such as dinner or admission to a performance in return for a payment to a charity. A
typical example of this sort would involve a taxpayer who pays ten dollars to his church and receives a
dinner worth six dollars in return. Since religious organizations are among those to which deductible
gifts may be made under I.R.C. § 170(c), the question is whether and to what extent an income tax
deduction will be allowed under § 170. This Revenue Ruling indicates that under these facts, a four
dollar deduction would be allowed.
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deduction when the taxpayer receives a direct or substantial benefit in
return for a transfer to a charitable organization.6 Moreover, the Revenue
Rulings published by the Internal Revenue Service are in hopeless disarray
and seem to adopt all of the courts' inconsistent reasoning, sometimes
within the same Revenue Ruling.7
This Article first discusses the history and purposes of section 170.
Next, it analyzes the reasoning that has been applied to the problems of
whether a deduction is allowed and how the deduction is measured when a
taxpayer receives a substantial or direct benefit in return for a contribu-
tion. Finally, the Article attempts to reconcile the approaches into a single
test of deductibility developed from the purposes of the charitable contri-
bution deduction and from the articulated and unarticulated reasoning of
the cases and Revenue Rulings. The suggested test was developed to be
consistent with the history and purposes of section 170 and to be adminis-
tratively feasible.
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 170
The charitable contribution deduction first appeared in the War
Revenue Act of 1917.8 The original charitable contribution deduction
section allowed a deduction for:
Contributions or gifts actually made within the year to corporations or
associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, or educational purposes, or to societies for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit
of any private stockholder or individual, to an amount not in excess of fifteen
per centum of the taxpayer's taxable net income as computed without the
benefit of this subparagraph. 9
This provision has been extensively amended over the years and, as
Congress amended the law to meet abuses and to provide benefits to
organizations that it felt should be helped, has grown from a fairly simple
provision to an immensely complex set of rules.
In its present form, section 170(a) provides the statutory basis for the
charitable contribution deduction by allowing "as a deduction any chari-
table contribution . ..payment of which is made within the taxable
year." 0 Section 170(c) defines the term "charitable contribution" as "a
contribution or gift to or for the use of" various specified types of organiza-
tions.1l Although section 170 and the regulations interpreting it provide
6. Each of the following cases contains one of the lines of analysis: Oppewal v. Commissioner,
468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); De Jong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962); Singer Co. v.
United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 197 1); The three lines of analysis will be discussed in great detail
later in this article.
7. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-185, 1976-1 C.B. 60, and text accompanying note 139 infra.
8. Ch. 23, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300 (1917).
9. War Revenue Act of 1917, eh. 63, title XII, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300 (1917).
10. I.R.C. § 170(a).
11. I.R.C. § 170(c).
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complex rules and definitions, the term "contribution or gift" is not
defined in the statute or in the Income Tax Regulations.1 2 Since there is no
definition of "contribution or gift" in section 170, the regulations, or the
legislative history of section 170, the courts have developed a definition
based on the common law concept of gifts and from analysis of the basic
purposes of the charitable contribution deduction. 13
A common law gift has traditionally been defined as a voluntary
transfer of property by one to another without any consideration or
compensation returning to the transferor.' 4 This definition has been ap-
plied generally in charitable contribution deduction cases. 5
Moreover, in order for there to be a valid inter vivos gift at common
law several specific elements must be satisfied:
(1) Competency of the donor to contract;
(2) a voluntary intent on the part of the donor to make the gift;
(3) delivery, either actual or symbolical, amounting to transfer of title;
(4) acceptance, actual or imputed;
(5) complete divestment of all control by the donor; and
(6) a lack of consideration in return for the gift.' 6
In general, these elements also must be satisfied for a transfer to be a
deductible contribution for tax purposes under section 170.
There are no cases under section 170 that deal with the first require-
ment that the donor must be competent to make a gift. It seems logical,
12. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-I(c)(5), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106:
Transfers of property to an organization described in section 170(c) which bear a direct
relationship to the taxpayer's trade or business and which are made with a reasonable
expectation of financial return commensurate with the amount of the transfer may constitute
allowable deductions as trade or business expenses rather than as charitable contributions.
See section 162 and the regulations thereunder.
This regulation section implies that a donor will not receive a charitable contribution deduction if the
donor receives a commensurate return benefit.
13. Whether a transfer is a gift is important in several areas of tax law in addition to the
charitable contribution deduction area. For example, I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) imposes a gift tax on "the
transfer of property by gift." The courts have had to develop definitions of gifts for gift tax purposes
under § 2501. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
In addition, under I.R.C. § 102(a) "the value of property acquired by gift" is excluded from gross
income for income tax purposes. The courts and the Internal Revenue Service have had to develop
definitions of gifts for purposes of I.R.C. § 102. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278
(1960); Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income Tax: The Meaning of the Word "Gift,"48 MINN. L.
REv. 215 (1964).
14. See Forsyth v. Reynolds, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 358, 365 (1853); Ellerson v. Grove, 44 F.2d 493,
496 (4th Cir. 1930).
Other cases have adopted slightly different forms of this definition. See, e.g.. Turnbull v. Thom-
sen, 171 Cal. App. 2d 779, 783, 341 P.2d 69, 72 (1959) ("A gift is a transfer of personal property, made
voluntarily and without consideration."); Combs v. Roark's Adm'r, 221 Ky. 679, 681, 299 S.W. 576,
578 (1927) ("[A] gift is a parting by the owner with his property without pecuniary consideration.").
15. See, e.g., Murphy v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 249, 252 (1970); DeJong v. Commissioner, 36
T.C. 896, 899 (1961), affd 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962). This general definition also has been adopted
for use in determining whether a gift has been made for the income tax exclusion for gifts under I.R.C. §
102. See, e.g., Botchford v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1936); Fitch v. Helvering, 70 F.2d 583
(8th Cir. 1934); Blair v. Rosseter, 33 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1929). It has also been adopted for gift tax
purposes. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Montague, 126 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1942).
16. In re Estate of Miller, 143 Cal. App. 2d 544, 549, 299 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1956).
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however, that a transfer by a person who was not competent to make a gift
for state law purposes would also not be a contribution or gift for chari-
table contribution deduction purposes because the attempted transfer
would not be effective to transfer any property to the charity. Thus, the
charity would receive nothing and the deduction would appropriately be
disallowed.
The third element of a common law gift, delivery of the money or
property, is required for a deductible contribution under section 170. This
is reflected in the Income Tax Regulations that state: "Ordinarily, a
contribution is made at the time delivery is effected. 17 Thus, if property
does not pass to a charity because there has not been delivery, a charitable
contribution deduction will not be allowed. This is a reasonable result
because the charity will receive no benefit from the attempted gift and the
property will remain in the hands of the donor or other noncharitable
parties such as the donor's heirs.
Section 170 probably also requires satisfaction of the fourth common
law element that the donee accept the gift. Although there appears to be no
authority on this point, it would be illogical to allow a deduction for an
attempted gift that has not been accepted by the charity because the charity
would not have received a benefit. In addition, if the gift has not been
accepted, there will be no completed gift for local law purposes and the
charity may never receive a benefit.
Section 170 also requires satisfaction of the fifth common law ele-
ment, complete divestment of control over the donated property, in order
for the gift to be deductible. The provisions of section 170 that deal with
gifts of future interests, partial interests, and the effective dates of gifts
specifically disallow a deduction if the donor has not completely divested
control over the property. Thus, section 170(a)(3) provides that a contribu-
tion of a future interest in tangible personal property "shall be treated as
made only when all intervening interests in, and rights to the actual
possession or enjoyment of, the property have expired or are held by per-
sons other than the taxpayer . .. The Income Tax Regulations define
future interest to include:
situations in which a donor purports to give tangible personal property to a
charitable organization, but has an understanding, arrangement, agreement,
etc., whether written or oral, with the charitable organization which has the
effect of reserving to, or retaining in, such donor a right to the use, possession,
or enjoyment of the property. 19
Section 170(f)(3) disallows a deduction for the contribution of a
partial interest in property that does not satisfy the rigid requirements
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-I(b), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 116. See also Broussard v. Commis-
sioner, 16 T.C. 23 (1951); Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 524 (1949).
18. I.R.C. § 170(a)(3).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-5(a)(4), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 128.
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applicable to contributions placed in trust.20 Therefore, if a donor retains
control over the donated property that is extensive enough to be a partial
interest, the deduction may be denied.21
In addition, the requirement of complete divestment of control of
donated property by the donor in order for the gift to be deductible is
reflected in the Income Tax Regulations providing:
If as of the date of a gift a transfer for charitable purposes is dependent upon
the performance of some act or the happening of a precedent event in order
that it might become effective, no deduction is allowable unless the possibility
that the charitable transfer will not become effective is so remote as to be
negligible.22
Therefore no deduction will be allowed if a donor retains the power to
prevent the transfer from becoming effective.
The case law substantiates the general requirement that the donor
must divest complete control in order for a transfer to qualify as a contri-
bution under section 170. In Burroughs Corp. v. Commissioner,23 the
taxpayer transferred land that it had owned for many years to a trust and
leased the property back for use as a recreational facility for its employees.
Under the trust agreement, the taxpayer had the power to remove trustees,
appoint successor trustees, and to terminate the trust and reacquire the
property. In holding that the power and control that was retained pre-
cluded a deduction, the court cited Smith v. Shaughnessy24 for the proposi-
tion that a gift has not been made if the donor does not abandon control
over the property and retains the power to recapture the property or to
make other disposition of the property.
The result of the provisions dealing with gifts of future interests,
partial interests, and the effective dates of gifts is that, in general, there will
be no deduction if the donor has not completely divested himself of control
over the property.
The common law elements of gifts discussed above generally apply to
charitable contribution deductions but cause few problems of interpreta-
tion. The common law also requires, however, that a gift be without
consideration and that it be made with donative intent. It is in these areas
20. I.R.C. § 170(f)(3). Under I.R.C. § 170(0(3), no deduction is allowed for the contribution ofa
remainder interest in trust unless the trust is a charitable remainder annuity trust or charitable
remainder unitrust under I.R.C. § 664 or a pooled income fund under I.R.C. § 642(c)(5). No deduction
is allowed under I.R.C. § 170(f)(3) for the contribution of an income interest in trust unless the charity
receives a guaranteed annuity or the charity receives a fixed percentage distributed yearly of the fair
market value of the trust property and the grantor is treated as the owner of the interest under I.R.C. §
671 dealing with grantor trusts.
21. But see I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B). This section contains exceptions to this rule for contributions
of remainder interests in personal residences or farms, undivided portions of the taxpayer's entire
interest in property, and for contributions of leases, options to purchase, easements and certain
remainders.
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(e), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 117.
23. 33 T.C. 389 (1959).
24. 318 U.S. 176 (1943).
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that there are difficulties and confusion with respect to charitable contri-
bution deductions. The common law requirement that a gift be without
consideration and that it be made with donative intent was generally
applied to charitable contribution deductions until 1962.
Wardwell Estate v. Commissioner25 shows the reasoning that was
used in section 170 cases before 1962. In this case the taxpayer, an invalid,
paid a "room endowment" to a home for the elderly where she was to live
for the rest of her life. The Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held
that the "room endowment" was a deductible contribution. In reaching
this conclusion, the court stated that the question to be answered was
"What was her 'intention' at the time the contribution or gift in question
was actually made ... 26 The court distinguished the donor's intentions
from motives or expectations.
Similarly, the court determined that the donor had not received
consideration in return for the "room endowment," quoting Philpott v.
Gruninger:
27
It is, however, not to be doubted that there is a clear distinction sometimes
between the motive that may induce to entering into a contract and the
consideration for the contract. Nothing is consideration that is not regarded
as such by both parties. It is the price voluntarily paid for a promisor's under-
taking. An expectation of results often leads to the formation of a contract,
but neither the expectation nor the result is the cause or meritorious recom-
pense in fact or in law.28
In 1962, the Ninth Circuit decided DeJong v. Commissioner,29 a case
that applied the "detached and disinterested generosity" test of section
102(b),3° first articulated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v.
Duberstein3" to determine if a transfer was a gift for section 170 purposes.
Since 1962, a number of cases have followed DeJong and concluded that
the reasoning of Duberstein should be used in charitable contribution
cases under section 170.32 Other cases, however, have concluded that the
reasoning of DeJong is incorrect and that the Duberstein "detached and
disinterested generosity" test does not apply to charitable contribution
cases.33 Thus, there is confusion about what donative intent is necessary to
25. 301 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1962).
26. Id. at 636.
27. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 570 (1871).
28. Id. at 577.
29. 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
30. I.R.C. § 102(b).
31. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
32. Allen v. United States, 541 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1976); Collman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d
1263 (9th Cir. 1975); McLaughlin v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 233 (1968), affd, 69-2 U.S.Tax Cas. 9468
(Ist Cir. 1969).
33. Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v.
Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir. 1967).
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make a deductible contribution and about the effect of consideration
received by the donor.
III. ALLOWABILITY AND MEASURE OF
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEDUCTIONS
WHEN THE DONOR RECEIVES BENEFITS
FROM THE CONTRIBUTION
The question of what donative intent is required under section 170 to
make a deductible gift arises most often when the donor receives a return
benefit from the transfer. One common factual situation involves pay-
ments to a charity with benefits in the form of goods or services returned to
the donor. Examples are payments to a charity that provides admission to
dinners or entertainment events for the donor34 or payments to a school
that provides education to the children of the donor. 5 A second common
factual situation involves transfers of land to a governmental agency in
return for the right to construct buildings 36 or because the land is about to
be taken by eminent domain by the government agency. The third major
category of litigation with respect to whether a transfer is made with the
necessary intent involves the relationship between the charitable contribu-
tion deduction under section 170 and the business expense deduction
under section 162.38 In the last type of case, the characterization of a
transfer as a charitable contribution would result in the loss of deductions
under both section 162 and section 170.39
Three lines of analysis have been developed by the courts and the
Internal Revenue Service to deal with the transferor's deduction under
these circumstances. The first line of reasoning assumes that the definition
34. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
35. See, e.g., Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); Winters v. Commis-
sioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962); Haak v.
United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Rev. Rul. 79-99, 1979-1 C.B. 108.
36. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 541 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1976); Stubbs v. United States, 428
F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971); Saba v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH)
446 (1980).
37. See, e.g., Coliman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1975).
38. See, e.g., Marquis v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 695 (1968), acq., 1971-2 C.B. 3.
39. Section 170(b) limits the percentage of the taxpayer's contribution base (as defined in §
170(b)(1)(E) ) or taxable income that may be deducted. For example, § 170(b)(2) provides that the
deduction allowed to corporations may not exceed five percent of the corporation's taxable income,
subject to certain adjustments. Section 170 limits the time of payment and the dollar amount of certain
deductible payments.
Section 162(a) allows deductions for ordinary and necessary business expenses, but § 162(b)
disallows business expense deductions for payments that would have been allowable as charitable
contribution deductions were it not for the limitations of § 170. Thus, if a corporation transfers an
amount in excess of five percent of its taxable income to a charity, it is to the taxpayer's advantage to
have the transfer not considered as charitable contribution, but as an ordinary and necessary business
expense deductible under § 162(a). Thus, in some situations a conclusion that an amount transferred to
a charity is not a contribution or gift under § 170 will be beneficial to the taxpayer because this
conclusion will allow the amount transferred to be deducted as an ordinary and necessary business
expense under § 162(a).
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of the term "contribution or gift" for section 170 purposes is the same as the
definition of "gift" for section 102 income exclusion purposes. Therefore,
according to some cases, the Supreme Court's analysis in Commissioner v.
Duberstein40 applies with full force to charitable contribution cases under
section 170.
Duberstein arose under section 22(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939,4' which provided that gifts were not to be included in the gross
income of the donees. The taxpayer, Duberstein, was the president of a
corporation that had done business for a number of years with Berman, the
president of another corporation. In the course of their dealings, Dubers-
tein gave Berman the names of potential customers for Berman's products.
Berman told Duberstein that the information Duberstein had provided
was so valuable that Berman wanted to give a Cadillac automobile to
Duberstein as a gift. Duberstein apparently had not expected the gift and it
was not given by Berman to pay any debt or satisfy any obligation.
Duberstein accepted the Cadillac insisting that he had not intended to be
compensated for the information he gave Berman.
Duberstein did not include the value of the automobile in his gross
income and the Internal Revenue Service asserted a deficiency against him
based on the value of the automobile. Berman's company, however,
deducted the value of the automobile from its income as a business
expense, classifying its cost as a "finder's fee" paid to Duberstein.
Thus, the issue in Duberstein was whether the value of the Cadillac
was excludable from Duberstein's income as a gift under what is now
section 102.42 There was no issue involving charitable contribution deduc-
tions and the Court did not consider the definition of contributions or gifts
for charitable contribution deduction purposes. The Court reversed the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and held that the Tax Court's
determination that there was no gift for section 102 purposes was not
clearly erroneous and should be sustained.43
In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the government's pro-
posed test that: "Gifts should be defined as transfers of property made for
personal as distinguished from business reasons." 4 The Court in discuss-
ing the term "gift" said:
The course of decision here makes it plain that the statute does not use
the term "gift" in the common-law sense, but in a more colloquial sense. This
Court has indicated that a voluntary executed transfer of his property by one
to another, without any consideration or compensation therefore, though a
common-law gift, is not necessarily a "gift" within the meaning of the statute.
40. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
41. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 22(b)(3), 52 Stat. 458 (1938).
42. I.R.C. § 102.
43. 363 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1960).
44. Id. at 284, n.6.
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For the Court has shown that the mere absence of a legal or moral obligation
to make such a payment does not establish that it is a gift. . . .And,
importantly, if the payment proceeds primarily from "the constraining force
of any moral or legal duty," or from "the incentive of anticipated benefit" of
an economic nature .. . it is not a gift. And conversely, "[w]here the
payment is in return for services rendered, it is irrelevant that the donor
derives no economic benefit from it." . . . A gift in the statutory sense, on
the other hand, proceeds from a "detached and disinterested generosity,"
. .."out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses." . . .
And in this regard, the most critical consideration, as the Court was agreed in
the leading case here, is the transferor's "intention." . . . "What controls is
the intention with which payment, however voluntary, has been made. 45
In addition, the court said that "[d]ecision of the issue presented in these
cases must be based ultimately on application of the fact-finding tribunal's
experience with the mainsprings of human conduct'to the totality of the
facts of each case. 46
The Supreme Court in Duberstein, therefore, created a test of "de-
tached and disinterested generosity" measured by "the mainsprings of hu-
man conduct" to be used in determiningwhether a gift has been made for
purposes of the income exclusion for gifts provided by section 102. Du-
berstein, however, involves only what is now section 102 and does not in
any way involve the charitable contribution deduction under section 170.
Therefore, the unresolved question is whether the reasoning of Duberstein
applies to define "contribution or gift" for purposes of section 170. The
courts and the Internal Revenue Service have adopted a variety of conflict-
ing viewpoints that are difficult to reconcile.
In DeJong v. Commissioner,47 the Ninth Circuit decided that the
Duberstein "detached and disinterested generosity" test applied to section
170. In DeJong, the taxpayers sent their children to a school that was
operated by a religious organization, the Society for Christian
48 SoiInstruction. The Society charged no tuition, but raised part of its funds
from parents of students at the school. The parents were given a general
idea of what the costs of educating the children would be and were asked to
contribute "to the best of their ability and to try to carry as much 'of the
load as they feel they can'., 49 Although approximately twenty percent of
the Society's total income came from parents of enrolled students, no
student was denied admission to the Society's schools because his parents
did not contribute.
45. Id. at 285-86 (citations omitted)
46. 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960).
47. 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
48. The Society for Christian Instruction was stipulated to be a tax-exempt organization
described in § 501(c)(3). Id. at 374. Although there was no specific finding that the Society was also
described in § 170(c) as an organization to which deductible charitable contributions could be made,
the Society appeared clearly to be an organization described in § 170(c) and the decision assumed that
it was.
49. 309 F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1962).
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The taxpayers paid $1,075 to the school for the 1958 calendar year and
claimed the entire amount as charitable contribution deduction. The
Internal Revenue Service disallowed $400 of the claimed deduction but
allowed a deduction of $675 as a charitable contribution. The Tax Court
sustained the disallowance of the $400 as nondeductible tuition.0
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that there were few "helpful decisions
construing the meaning of the terms 'charitable contribution' or'charitable
gift' as used in § 170.,,51 But rather than analyzing the purposes of section
170, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Duberstein "detached and disinterested
generosity" test without considering whether the same test should be used
in defining a gift for section 170 purposes as that used for section 102
purposes. After quoting extensively from Duberstein, the Ninth Circuit
said that the Duberstein criteria "are clearly applicable to a charitable
deduction under § 170. "52 Based on this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court's holding that $400 of the $1,075 paid to the
Society was not deductible because it was tuition.
In DeJong, the taxpayers paid $1,075 to the Society, and were allowed
a charitable deduction of $675. Because the Ninth Circuit held that the
Duberstein "detached and disinterested generosity" reasoning applied to
charitable contribution deduction cases, it must have determined that the
payment of $675 was motivated by "detached and disinterested gener-
osity," and was not motivated by" 'the incentive of anticipated benefit' of
an economic nature. 53 The court also must have decided, under the Du-
berstein reasoning, that the remaining $400 paid by the parents was not
motivated by the necessary generous motives and therefore was a nonde-
ductible tuition payment.
Although it does not discuss the point, the Ninth Circuit must have
considered the transaction in DeJong to have been in two parts, with
different income tax treatment for each part. Moreover, the only way the
Ninth Circuit's holding can be reconciled with Duberstein is to view the
transaction as two transactions: the first transaction was a nondeductible
tuition payment of $400 to the Society and the second was a deductible
contribution of $675 that was motivated by "detached and disinterested
50. 36 T.C. 896. Tuition payments are non-deductible personal or family expenses. In Channing
v. United States, the court stated:
As a lexigraphic proposition, it can also be conceded that the word "contribution" may
properly be employed in referring to payments of tuition. Nevertheless, as a legal proposition,
I cannot believe that Congress ever intended to give to the act an interpretation wide enough
to admit payments made by a taxpayer as a price for a service rendered. The colleges and
schools provided instruction and maintenance for a price, namely, tuition. While in a sense
the payment of the price involved the idea of a contribution to the institution for educational
purposes, there was no such voluntary donation to the purposes of education as was
contemplated by the act. 4 F. Supp. 33, 34 (D. Mass. 1933), affdper curiam, 67 F.2d 986 (Ist
Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 686 (1934).
51. 309 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1962).
52. Id. at 379.
53. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
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generosity" and "out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like
impulses. 54
Thus, even though the Ninth Circuit purported to base its decision in
DeJong on an analysis of the intentions and generosity of the donors, the
holding of the case was apparently reached by simply subtracting the value
of the education received, $400, from the total amount transferred, $1,075,
to arrive at the amount deductible, $675. It is difficult to escape the feeling
that the court first decided that $675 more was given to the Society than the
value of the education received in return and that, therefore, the transfer of
$675 was made because of "detached and disinterested generosity. 55
The Ninth Circuit has applied the test developed in DeJong to cases
involving the transfer of land to a government agency in return for a
benefit to the donee.16 For example, in Collman v. Commissioner,57 the
taxpayer transferred land to a county for the construction of roads. He
agreed to dedicate 2.549 acres to the county in exchange for a promise to
construct roads wider than the interim width roads planned by the county.
The county also agreed to construct gutters and curbs. The county would
have required 1.759 (value at $33,314) of the 2.549 acres to build the roads
to their interim width and would have condemned the 1.759 acres if the
taxpayer had not agreed to dedicate the property. The additional .79 acres
was the amount of land necessary to build the roads to their wider width.
The additional cost to the county to build the roads wider was $20,711.
More than a year later the taxpayer petitioned for and was granted a
zoning change for part of his land.
Under these facts the Tax Court held that the taxpayers were entitled
to deduct only the value of the 1.759 acres ($33,314), less the cost to the
county of constructing the roads beyond their interim widths ($20,711 ).5
The Tax Court held that the conveyance of the other .79 acres used to
widen the roads was not a charitable contribution because that conveyance
was made for the business purpose of obtaining zoning changes.5 9 The
Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision that the transfer of the .79
acres was not deductible because the evidence did not support the Tax
54. Id.
55. Viewed this way, the treatment is similar to the treatment of bargain sales to charities. See
Singer Co. v. United States,449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(c)(2), T.D. 7207, 1972-
2 C.B. 106; cf. I.R.C. § 1011 (b) (concerning adjusted basis for determining gain or loss on a bargain sale
to a charity). In a bargain sale, a taxpayer sells property to a charity for less than its value and deducts
the excess of the value over the sale price as a charitable contribution. DeJong, in effect, involved
taxpayers who purchased educational services from a charity, but who paid more for the services than
their value. In both the bargain sale to a charity and the DeJong situation, the taxpayer transfers
something of value to a charity and receives something of lesser value in return. A deduction is allowed
for the difference.
56. See Allen v. United States, 541 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1976); Collmanv. Commissioner,511 F.2d
1263 (9th Cir. 1975); Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009
(1971); United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968).
57. 511 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1975).
58. 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 416 (1973).
59. Id. at 423-24.
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Court's conclusion that there was lack of donative intent. The court,
however, upheld the Tax Court's conclusion that the allowable deduction
must be reduced by the value of the construction work performed by the
county for Collman. Thus, the result of the decision of the Tax Court, as
modified by the Ninth Circuit, was identical to the result reached in
DeJong, since the taxpayer was allowed a charitable contribution deduc-
tion for the value of the property transferred, less the value of the benefits
he received in return.
To reach this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit again must have treated
the factual situation as two transactions, with different legal effects for
each, as it did in DeJong. One transaction was a deductible transfer made,
under the Duberstein test, with the necessary "detached and disinterested
generosity" and the other part was a nondeductible transfer that lacked the
necessary "detached and disinterested generosity." The court appeared not
to recognize that the effect of its decision was to treat the facts as two
transactions, each with different legal consequences. The transaction,
however, must have been broken into two parts to make the analysis and
conclusion consistent with Duberstein.
The Ninth Circuit has not consistently applied the transaction split-
ting approach of DeJong. For example, in Allen v. United States,60 the
Ninth Circuit approved a decision of the district court that allowed a
deduction for the entire value of land transferred to a county in connection
with the taxpayer's efforts to obtain necessary permission to build a
housing development. Judge Williams, in a dissenting opinion, believed
that the transfer was not made with the necessary "detached and disinter-
ested generosity," but was motivated by the" 'expectation of the receipt of
certain specific direct economic benefits within the power of the recipient
to bestow directly or indirectly, which otherwise might not be forthcom-
ing."' 61 Thus, he would have disallowed all of the deduction. Accordingly,
both the majority and the dissent treated the transaction as a single one
requiring the deduction to be allowed or disallowed in its entirety.62
Neither appears to have considered viewing the transaction as, in reality,
part "contribution or gift" and part business transfer, as was done in
DeJong or in Collman. On close analysis, therefore, the reasoning that
supports the conclusion in Allen appears to be inconsistent with other
decisions from the Ninth Circuit.
In general, the weight of authority in all circuits is in favor of the
application of the Duberstein "detached and disinterested generosity" test
60. 541 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1976).
61. Id. at 789, quoting Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1970).
62. In Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970), and United States v. Transamerica
Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968), the Ninth Circuit used reasoning similar to Judge Williams' to
disallow deductions for transfers of land in their entirety. The court did not allow a deduction for the
excess of the value of what was given over what was received in return, as was done in DeJong v.
Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962) and in Collman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir.
1975).
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to charitable contribution cases. 63 The DeJong reasoning has been fol-
lowed by the Second 4 and Tenth Circuits.65 In addition, some Tax Court
decisions have adopted the DeJong approach.66 Nevertheless, not all
courts follow DeJong. The First Circuit67 and the Seventh Circuit 68 have
rejected the "detached and disinterested generosity" test and have adopted
other means of analyzing charitable contribution deduction cases.
The First Circuit, in Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner,69
was the first to reject the DeJong reasoning. In Crosby Valve & Gage Co.,
the court affirmed the Tax Court's holding that a payment by a business
corporation to a charitable organization that owned the corporation was
not deductible. The First Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court's reliance
on the "detached and disinterested generosity" reasoning:
While agreeing with the holding of the Tax Court, we think it necessary to
register our disagreement with the majority's emphasis upon a purely chari-
table motive as a prerequisite for a deductible charitable contribution. Were
the deductibility of a contribution under section 170(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 to depend on "detached and disinterested generosity",
an important area of tax law would become a mare's nest of uncertainty
woven of judicial value judgments irrelevant to eleemosynary reality. Com-
munity goodwill, the desire to avoid community bad will, public pressures of
other kinds, tax avoidance, prestige, conscience-salving, a vindictive desire to
prevent relatives from inheriting family wealth-these are only some of the
motives which may lie close to the heart or so-called heart, of one who gives to
a charity. If the policy of the income tax laws favoring charitable contribu-
tions is to be effectively carried out, there is good reason to avoid unnecessary
intrusions of subjective judgments as to what prompts the financial support
of the organized but non-governmental good works of society.7
Moreover, the court did not believe that the subjective judgments required
by the DeJong analysis were necessary. Rather, the taxpayer's payment of
tuition was "clearly 'personal .. .or family expenses', Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 262, rather than 'gifts or charitable contributions'.' In addition,
the court rejected the DeJong test because the policy behind section 170
was not only different from the policy of section 102, but also would be
63. See Disinterested Generosity: An Emerging Criteria of Deductibility Under Section 170,
1968 UTAH L. REv. 475, for an analysis of the law up to 1968.
64. In Winters v. Commissioner,468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), the Second Circuit considered facts
virtually identical to DeJong and affirmed the Tax Court's disallowance of the entire amount paid to
an education fund used to finance a church operated school attended by the taxpayers' children. The
court apparently believed that the entire amount paid to the fund was nondeductible tuition.
65. Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977).
66. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 233 (1968), affdpercuriam, 69-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9467 (1st Cir. 1969).
67. Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (Ist Cir. 1972); Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v.
Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146 (Ist Cir. 1967).
68. Sedam v. United States, 518 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975); Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25
(7th Cir. 1975).
69. 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir. 1967).
70. Id. at 146-47 (footnotes omitted).
71. Id. at 147.
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frustrated were the court to apply the section 102 test to charitable contri-
bution cases.72
The First Circuit continued its rejection of DeJong in Oppewal v.
United States,73 a case similar to DeJong. In Oppewal, the taxpayer gave
money to a Society for Christian Instruction that provided education for
the taxpayers' children. Although no specific amount of tuition was
required to be paid, the First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding that
part of the money paid to the Society was nondeductible tuition; however,
it allowed a deduction for the rest of the amount paid. The First Circuit
once again rejected DeJong's subjective test in favor of an objective test
saying:
The more fundamental objective tests is-however the payment was desig-
nated, and whatever motives the taxpayer had in making it, was it, to any
substantial extent, offset by the cost of services rendered to taxpayers in the
nature of tuition? If so, the payment to the extent of the offset, should be
regarded as tuition for, in substance, it served the same function as tuition.74
Therefore, on virtually identical facts, the Ninth Circuit in DeJong
and the First Circuit in Oppewal reached identical holdings-that is, the
part of the payment that represented the cost of education received was not
deductible, but the excess was deductible. Rather than basing its decision
on the Duberstein conception of "detached and disinterested generosity,"
"the mainsprings of human conduct," or other subjective factors, however,
the First Circuit reached its conclusion by a simple mathematical process
of subtracting the value of the education received from the amount trans-
ferred to the charity. The excess was allowed as a charitable contribution
deduction, without regard to the taxpayer's state of mind in making the
transfer.
While not expressly rejecting the "detached and disinterested generos-
ity" test, the Seventh Circuit has adopted a position that does not follow
72. Id. Specifically, the court said:
What is confusing in such cases and in the Tax Court's opinion is reference to the law
excluding from the gross income of individuals the value of property acquired by gift. See
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 80 S. Ct. 1190,4 L.Ed.2d
1218 (1960). For in such cases it is important to scrutinize the motive of the transferor, to
prevent the disguising of compensation for services rendered, e.g., Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 76 S. Ct. 800, 100 L.Ed. 1142 (1956), and allow exclusion
only of property given from "a detached and disinterested generosity", Robertson v. United
States, 343 U.S. 711, 72 S. Ct. 994, 96 L.Ed. 1237 (1952). While the law recognizes gifts to
individuals and organizations other than charities, it does not so positively encourage them.
And, particularly when the transfer of property without consideration is made beyond a
family setting and in a business atmosphere, it is properly subjected to a searching inquiry as
to the real motivation of the transferor.
But in the case of a contribution to a charitable organization, the law's policy finds
charity in the purposes and works of the qualifying organization, not in the subjective intent
of the contributor.
73. 468F.2d1000(IstCir. 1972).
74. Id. at 1002; See Comment, Deductions for Charitable Contributions- An Objective Test, 8
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 349 (1974).
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the reasoning of DeJong. In Sedam v. United States,75 the Seventh Circuit
refused to enter into the controversy over whether "detached and disinter-
ested generosity" is necessary for a deduction, saying:
We need not enter that dispute in order to decide this case. It is at least clear
that a payment is not a contribution or gift under section 170 if it is made with
the expectation of receiving a commensurate benefit in return, as we find to be
true here.76
In Mason v. United States,77 a case involving a bargain sale,78 the
Seventh Circuit concentrated on the value question after holding that a
jury's conclusion that a gift had been made was supported by the evidence.
It held that since the taxpayer at the time of the gift did not expect to
receive a financial benefit commensurate with the amount transferred to
the charity, the excess of the amount transferred over the amount received
in return was deductible.79
In 1969, the United States Court of Claims decided Singer Co. v.
United States,8° a case that establishes the third line of analysis used in
charitable contribution deduction cases. The Singer Company was a
manufacturer and supplier of sewing machines that were sold at full price
to the public and at discount to certain individuals and charitable organi-
zations. The machines sold to charitable organizations were discounted
either twenty or forty-five percent. Therefore, the charities paid either
seventy-five or fifty-five percent of the retail price for the machines."'
The Court of Claims first determined that these were bargain sales to
the charitable organizations and that any allowable deductions would be
measured by the retail sale price of the machines. The government con-
tended that the Duberstein "detached and disinterested generosity" rea-
soning applied to section 170 cases and should be used. After a careful
review of the case law, the Court of Claims rejected the government's
reasoning, saying that the Duberstein test
is obviously not one that can be applied with the assumption that the most
judicious approach to the problem has been used. It is for the above reason,
75. 518 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
76. Id. at 245; however, the court did say that "[t]he taxpayer's intention governs, not his
characterization of the payments 'contributions' or 'gifts.' " Id.
77. 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975).
78. See note 55 supra.
79. The Court's reasoning involved two steps. First, the court concluded that there was a bargain
sale. That is, the taxpayer sold valuable assets for less than their fair market value. Therefore, the
transaction was partly a sale and partly a gift. Second, the court determined the value of the gift,
measured by the difference between the value of the transferred assets and the payment received for
them.
80. 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
81. The Singer Company sold machines to schools at a 45% discount; that is, schools paid 55% of
the market price for the machines. It sold machines at a 25% discount to churches and some charitable
organizations and at a 45% discount to other charitable organizations, including the Red Cross, public
hospitals and government agencies.
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plus a feeling of uneasiness about using such an approach, that we avoid
resting our decision on the "disinterested generosity" rules.1
2
In rejecting the DeJong analysis, the Court of Claims relied upon the
legislative history of section 162(b) of the Code,8 3 which emphasizes that
charitable gifts are "those contributions which are made with no expecta-
tion of a financial return commensurate with the amount of the gift. '8 4 The
Court of Claims went on to say, in language that is often quoted:
It is our opinion that if the benefits received, or expected to be received, are
substantial, and meaning by that, benefits greater than those that inure to the
general public from transfers for charitable purposes (which benefits are
merely incidental to the transfer), then in such case we feel the transferor has
received, or expects to receive, a quid pro quo sufficient to remove the
transfer from the realm of deductibility under section 170. With this standard,
we feel that the subjective approach of "disinterested generosity" need not be
wrestled with .... 85
Based on this reasoning, the Court of Claims concluded that the
discounts allowed to public and private schools were "of a business nature
and not charitable. 86 In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Claims
quoted from the report of its Commissioner that the discounts to the
school were offered
for thepredominate purpose of encouraging those institutions to interest and
train young women in the art of machine sewing; thereby enlarging the future
potential market by developing prospective purchasers of home sewing
machines and, more particularly, Singer machines-the brand on which the
future buyers learned to sew.87
The Court of Claims, therefore, concluded that "the plaintiff's pre-
dominate reason for granting such discounts was other than charita-
ble . . .plaintiff expected a return in the nature of future increased sales.
This expectation, even though perhaps not fully realized, provided a quid
82. 449 F.2d 413, 422 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
83. H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., A44, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD.
NEWS 4013, 4180; S. REP. No. 1622,83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 196, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4621, 4830-31. These committee reports read:
Subsection (b) is derived from section 23(a)(1)(B) of the 1939 Code. This section provides that
no business deduction is available for any contribution which would be deductible as a
charitable gift, were it not for the percentage limitation on such gifts. This was the rule for
corporations under section 23(a)(1)(B) of the 1939 Code and this section now extends the rule
to individuals. No substantive change is made in the application of this rule. As under present
law, it applies only to gifts, i.e., those contributions which are made with no expectation of
financial return commensurate with the amount of the gift. For example, the limitation
would not apply to a payment by an individual to a hospital in consideration of a binding
obligation to provide medical treatment for the individual's employees. It would apply only if
there were no expectation of any quid pro quo from the hospital.
84. 449 F.2d 413, 422 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
85. Id. at 423 (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 424.
87. Id. at 423 (emphasis in original).
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pro quo for those discounts which was substantial. 88 Thus, the Court of
Claims, even though it rejected the "detached and disinterested generosity"
test of Duberstein, did consider the taxpayer's reasons and purposes for
granting the discounts, and denied the deduction because the taxpayer
expected a substantial return benefit.
With respect to discounts allowed to charities other than schools, the
Court of Claims approved the conclusion of its Commissioner that the
primary purpose of such discounts was to assist the recipient organizations in
the performance of the charitable, religious or public services that they were
currently providing. The incidental effect of this policy was the development
and maintenance of a favorable public image for plaintiff in the eyes of those
organizations and their members. 89
The Court of Claims went on to say that "[s]uch a finding, together
with our agreement therewith, makes it difficult to see how the plaintiff
could derive substantial benefits from such discounts in the way of in-
creased sales." 90 The Singer Company therefore, was allowed to deduct the
amount of the difference between the discount price at which the machines
were sold and the retail price.
The reasoning in Singer is inconsistent with its conclusion. The Court
of Claims began its analysis by saying that no charitable contribution
deduction will be allowed if the donor receives a quidpro quo in the form
of a substantial return benefit. The facts clearly show, however, that the
Singer Company received a cash payment of either fifty-five or seventy-
five percent of the retail price of each machine in return for its transfer to a
charity. The receipt of money equal to more than half of the value of the
machines is clearly a substantial benefit "greater than those that inure to
the general public from transfers for charitable purposes,"9 1 regardless of
whatever other benefits were received, such as goodwill or advertising.
In reaching the conclusion that the discounts allowed to some of the
charities were deductible, the Court of Claims appears to have concluded
that the only transfer made to the charities was the value of the discounts.
That is, if a machine with a retail value of one hundred dollars was sold to a
church for seventy-five dollars, the Court of Claims considered only
whether the twenty-five dollar discount resulted in a substantial return
benefit. However, the Singer Company transferred a value of one hundred
dollars, and received in return seventy-five dollars in cash and additional
88. Id. at 424. Examples of incidental benefits would be the general benefits received by the
public from a hospital that provides improved health care to the community because of contributions
to it. Another example of incidental benefits would be the general benefits to the public from improved
education resulting from contributions to schools. See generally Citizens and S. Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 243 F. Supp. 900 (W.D.S.C. 1965); Sutton v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 225 (1971);Rev. Rul. 80-
77,1980-12 I.R.B. 8; Rev. Rul. 67-446, 1967-2 C.B. 119.
89. 449 F.2d413,424(Ct.Cl. 1971).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 423.
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valuable benefits in the form of future sales and goodwill. There is no
logical reason why the cash and the goodwill should not be considered
together in determining whether there was a substantial return benefit to
the donor for the transfer of a machine at a bargain price.
Because the Court of Claims considered only whether the amount in
excess of the sale price was transferred in return for substantial return
benefits, the Court of Claims must have conceptually divided the transfer
into two parts, as was done by the Ninth Circuit in DeJong. To use the
previous example of a sale of a one hundred dollar machine for seventy-
five dollars, seventy-five dollars of the value of the machine was treated as
a transfer for which a quidpro quo was received in return and, therefore,
no deduction was allowed. The other twenty-five dollars of value trans-
ferred was treated as a transfer for which no quidpro quo was received and
was, therefore, allowed as a deduction.
Alternatively, Singer might be viewed as standing for the proposition
that when a return benefit is received by the donor that is less than the total
value transferred, that part of the value transferred that is equal to the
value received in return is not deductible because there is a quidpro quo,
but that the value transferred in excess of what was received in return is
deductible. Viewed in this manner, the Singer test would be identical to the
Oppewal test; however, even though Singer reached the same conclusion
as Oppewal, Singer has been cited as holding that if any substantial return
benefit is received, no deduction will be allowed regardless of whether the
return benefit is of less value than the amount transferred to the charity.92
The Court of Claims in Singer therefore has developed a third method
of analyzing charitable contribution deductions. Under the Singer test, a
taxpayer may not deduct any part of the value of a transfer to a charity if
there is substantial return benefit, regardless of whether the return benefit
is commensurate with the value transferred. On the other hand, if the
return benefit is merely incidental, a deduction will be allowed.93
In summary, the courts of appeals and the Court of Claims have
developed three lines of analysis with respect to the intent necessary for a
deduction to be allowed under section 170. First, several courts of appeals
have adopted the Duberstein "detached and disinterested generosity"
test.94 Second, other courts of appeals have adopted an objective test that
rejects the Duberstein reasoning and allows a deduction for the difference
between the amount given and the value of the benefits received in return.95
Finally, the third type of analysis used is based on the Court of Claims
decision in Singer Co. v. United States,96 which holds that if the donor
92. See Rev. Rul. 76-257, 1976-2 C.B. 52.
93. See note 88 supra.
94. See, e.g., Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977); Winters v. Commissioner,
468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
95. See, e.g., Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975); Oppewal v. Commissioner,
468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972).
96. 449F.2d413(Ct.Cl.1971).
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receives a substantial benefit (which need not be commensurate with the
amount transferred to the charity) in return for the transfer, no deduction
will be allowed. Singer specifically rejects the "detached and disinterested
generosity" test of Duberstein.97
The Tax Court has decided a number of cases on the issue of chari-
table contribution deduction involving return benefits. 98 The Tax Court's
decisions, however, are inconsistent in their analysis of the issue. 99 Some
Tax Court decisions follow the DeJong adaptation of the Duberstein
"detached and disinterested generosity" test. oo Other Tax Court decisions
question whether the DeJong reasoning should be used in charitable
contribution cases.' 0' In addition, some Tax Court cases have adopted, to
a certain extent, the Singer reasoning.1
0 2
In Grinslade v. Commissioner,0 3 the taxpayers conveyed land to a
municipality under an agreement with the municipality that allowed the
taxpayer to develop land. The Tax Court held that the taxpayers "entered
into the entire transaction with the expectation of financial benefits com-
mensurate with the value of the property conveyed.' 0 4 Accordingly, they
were not entitled to a charitable contribution deduction under section 170.
Grinslade, therefore, followed the reasoning of Oppewal by looking to
whether the return benefit was commensurate (rather than merely substan-
tial, as in Singer) in order to determine whether a deduction was to be
allowed.
In 1978, the Tax Court in Dockery v. Commissioner, 1 5 retreatedfrom its application of the Duberstein test in charitable contribution cases
97. Id. at418-23.
98. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 962 (1976) (transfer of
easement for business purposes); Suttonv. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 239 (1971) (transfer of easement to
municipality in return for permit to develop land); Wolfe v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1707 (1970)
(payment for water and sewer systems); Murphy v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 249 (1970) (adoption
expenses); McLoughlin v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 233 (1968) (tuition payment); Howard v. Commis-
sioner, 39 T.C. 833 (1963) (payment for privilege of practicing medicine in a hospital); Wood v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1 (1962) (payment for maintenance of a cemetery plot).
99. Inconsistency in the Tax Court's holding may be required by the Tax Court's policy of
following a controlling decision of the Court of Appeals to which an appeal would lie, even if the
conclusion is contrary to other Tax Court opinions. See Golson v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742,756-58
(1970).
Therefore in a case that would be appealed to the Ninth Circuit, the Tax Court would follow
DeJong. In a case that would be appealed to the First Circuit the Tax Court would follow OppewaL
100. See, e.g., Fausner v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 620 (1971); Wolfe v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
1707 (1970); Howard v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 833 (1963).
101. See, e.g., Marquis v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 695 (1968); Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 45
T.C. 311 (1965).
102. See, e.g., Dockery v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 317 (1978); Louisville & Nashville
R.R. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 962 (1976); but see Saba v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 446
(1980).
103. 59 T.C. 566 (1973).
104. Id. at 577.
105. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 317 (1978). This case contains original reasoning and a careful analysis of
an unsettled area of the law. It is curious, therefore, that this case is a memorandum decision rather
than a regular Tax Court decision.
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and held that the Singer test is to be used, at least where the contribution is
made by a business organization. 10 6 In Dockery, the taxpayer promised a
city that he would install a six inch water pipeline in return for the city's
promise to pay one-half of the cost of the pipeline. After constructing the
pipeline, the taxpayer conveyed it to the city as was required by the city
ordinances. Later, the taxpayer connected a one-inch pipeline in order to
serve buildings used in his business. The taxpayer contended that a chari-
table contribution deduction should be allowed. The court thoroughly
reviewed the application of the Duberstein reasoning and stated that:
"[W]hile the Duberstein criteria may still hold validity with respect to
charitable contributions made by individuals . . ., we believe these crite-
ria are inappropriate to determine if a business entity, such as a corpora-
tion or partnership has made a charitable contribution entitling it to a
deduction under section 170. ''1°7 The Tax Court pointed out that it had
noted the Singer test with approval in Louisville & Nashville Railroad v.
Commissioner,10 8 stating, however, that although its holding also relied
upon the DeJong test, it
did not apply the rigid Duberstein criteria for which DeJong might also be
noted, but rather cited it for the more limited proposition that a gift is a
voluntary transfer of property by the owner without receiving consideration
therefor from the donee. This is a less restrictive test than Duberstein for
clearly there are instances in which a business entity may make a donation
with less than a "disinterested generosity" and yet receive little or no benefit
therefrom. Under Duberstein, such donations would be denied the benefits of
section 170. Similarly, there are instances in which a business may make a
donation without receiving consideration from the donor and yet reap a
substantial benefit therefrom. 0 9
Thus, the court held that the taxpayers received consideration suffi-
cient to deny them a deduction, and in the alternative, that "petitioners
herein received benefits which were greater than those received by other
members of the public, none of whom benefited in any respect from the
lines installation . . . and that the . . . water line . . . was construct-
ed primarily from the expectation of a direct benefit for their busi-
106. Id. The Tax Court cited Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c)(I)T.D. 6605,1962-2 C.B. 73 and § 1.170A-
l(c)(5) T.D. 7207,1972-2 C.B. 106. These regulation sections state that
[t]ransfers of property to an organization described in section 170(c) which bear a direct
relationship to the taxpayer's trade or business and which are made with a reasonable
expectation of financial return commensurate with the amount of the transfer may constitute
allowable deductions as trade or business expenses rather than as charitable contributions.
107. 37 T.C. M. (CCH) 317, 320-21 (1978). The Tax Court discussed and cited Allen v. United
States, 541 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968);
Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146 (Ist Cir. 1967); Singer Co. v. United States,
449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Marquis v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 695 (1968); Perlmutter v. Commission-
er, 45 T.C. 311 (1966). Although the cases cited by the Tax Court do point out the problems of the
"detached and disinterested generosity" test as applied to business entities, Dockery is the only case
that clearly holds that a different test is to be used with respect to contributions by business organiza-
tions from the test applicable to individuals.
108. 66 T.C. 962 (1976).
109. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 317, 321-22 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
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ness. .. ,""o The Tax Court also concluded that part of the transfer
resulted in no benefit to the general public and thus was not deductible in
that the transfer was for the exclusive benefit of a private real estate
developer."' Accordingly, the court adopted the Singer reasoning." 2
The Tax Court, therefore, appears to have had considerable difficulty
in deciding how to analyze charitable contribution cases. The inconsistent
reasoning of its cases attests to this difficulty. Some Tax Court decisions
adopt the Duberstein "detached and disinterested generosity" test;113 other
cases rely upon Singer, a case that rejects the Duberstein reasoning;' 14 and
in some cases it is difficult to see what reasoning was used." 5 In addition,
the Tax Court in Dockery v. Commissioner,1 6 created a new test with
respect to charitable contributions by business entities.
In view of the judicial confusion, one might expect that the Internal
Revenue Service would adopt one view or another and consistently apply
it to all cases. This has not happened. In its published Revenue Rulings, the
Internal Revenue Service has adopted all three views of what a gift is and
has never tried to explain or reconcile the inconsistencies. Thus, the
Internal Revenue Service appears to be even more confused than the
courts about the definition of a gift for the purposes of section 170.1 7
Although there are no Revenue Rulings that directly discuss whether the
Duberstein reasoning applies to charitable contribution deductions, Du-
berstein has been cited with respect to charitable contribution
deductions." 8 Duberstein, however, has not been cited in certain recent
Revenue Rulings even though these Rulings derive from factual situations
that would logically require a discussion of Duberstein."9
110. Id. at 322. In reaching this conclusion, the Tax Court cited Wolfe v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
707 (1970), a factually analogous case.
111. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 317, 322 (1978).
112. There was, however, inconsistent dicta. The Tax Court said that: "Although a deduction
under section 170 is allowed for the excess of the amount transferred over the amount of financial or
economic benefit received on the transfer, . . . we do not believe that petitioners are entitled to
deduct the incremental cost borne in constructing the larger line." Id.
This statement is inconsistent with the holding of the case in that Dockery disallows the deduction
because there is a substantial return benefit and does not consider or allow a deduction for the excess of
the amount transferred over the amount of benefit received in return, as was done in Oppewal v.
Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (Ist Cir. 1972) and in DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir.
1962).
113. See generally cases cited in note 100 supra.
114. See generally cases cited in note 101 supra.
115. See, e.g., Babilonia v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 485 (1980); Saba v. Commissioner
40 T.C.M. (CCH) 446 (1980).
116. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 317 (1978).
117. The Internal Revenue Service has refused to reply to the question of whether the Duberstein
analysis applies to § 170. Letter from Anthony Manzanares, Jr., Chief, Individual Income Tax Branch
to James W. Colliton (August 24, 1979).
118. See Rev. Rul. 71-112, 1971-1 C.B. 93; Rev. Rul. 71-269, 1971-1 C.B. 93.
119. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-99, 1979-1 C.B. 108, a Revenue Ruling based on facts essentially
identical to those of Oppewalv. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972), DeJongv. Commission-
er, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962). See also Rev. Rul. 79-148, 1979-1 C.B. 93, (involving a payment to a
charity as a condition of probation); Rev. Rul. 78-232, 1978-1 C.B. 69, and Rev. Rul. 78-189, 1978-1
C.B. 68.
1980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The last Revenue Ruling to cite Duberstein is Revenue Ruling 71-
269120 dealing with the repayment of financial assistance provided to high
school students to encourage them to pursue higher education. The stu-
dents signed loan agreements that were unenforceable because the students
were minors when they signed the agreements. The ruling cites Duberstein
and DeJong in holding that the repayments were considered to be for the
benefits received and that there was no voluntary transfer that would give
rise to a charitable contribution deduction. 2 1 The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice has not cited Duberstein in a Revenue Ruling since the publication of
Revenue Ruling 71-269.
Since the publication of Revenue Ruling 71-269, some Revenue
Rulings have relied on the Singer reasoning in holding that a donor who
receives a substantial benefit that is greater than the benefit that would
inure to the general public will not be allowed a section 170 deduction. For
example, in Revenue Ruling 76-257,122 the taxpayers were land owners in a
rural area who pledged a sum of money to a county on condition that the
county pave roads near the taxpayers' property. The taxpayers issued a
promissory note to the county for the amount of the pledge conditioned
and payable upon completion of the project. The Revenue Ruling holds
that the amounts paid to the county were not deductible because "the
taxpayer could reasonably expect to receive benefits substantially greater
than those that would inure to the general public. '12 3 The Revenue Ruling
does not compare the value of what the taxpayers gave with the value of
having the roads paved, nor does it conclude that the value received by the
taxpayer was commensurate with the value given up.124
Some Revenue Rulings interpret the Singer reasoning to allow no
deduction if a payment to a charity is consideration for a contract. 2 5 For
example, in Revenue Ruling 71-112,126 the taxpayers paid 5X dollars
"tuition fee" to a school attended by their children and lOX dollars as a
"donation" required to be given to the school as a condition of enrollment.
The Revenue Ruling holds that "payments of both the tuition fee and the
so-called 'donation' represents consideration between the parties. There-
fore, each lacks a donative intent and is not a gift for purposes of section
170 of the Code." 127 The Revenue Ruling does not consider whether the
120. 1971-1 C.B. 93. See also Letter Ruling 7102040200A, note 145 infra.
121. Duberstein is also cited in Rev. Rul. 71-112, 1971-1 C.B. 93 for the proposition that "[i]f a
payment proceeds primarily from the incentive of anticipated benefit to the payer beyond the satisfac-
tion which flows from the performance of a generous act, it is not a gift."
122. 1976-2 C.B. 52.
123. Id. at 52.
124. This Revenue Ruling appears to be inconsistent with other Revenue Rulings that allow
deductions under similar circumstances. See Rev. Rul. 67-446, 1967-2 C.B. 119.
125. In a contract sense, a consideration necessary to support a contract need not becommensu-
rate with the value received. See L. Simpson, SIMPSON ON CONTRACTS, 86-87 (2d ed. 1965).
126. 1971-1 C.B. 93.
127. Id. at 93.
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value of the education received is commensurate with the payments in
determining that the "donation" part of the payment could not be
deducted. 28 The Internal Revenue Service has cited Singer in other Reve-
nue Rulings, but it is not clear whether the reasoning of Singer was in fact
used to reach a conclusion.1
29
The third line of reasoning to be found in the Revenue Rulings is
similar to that used by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Oppewal v. Commissioner.130 Oppewal, it will be remembered, rejected the
Duberstein "detached and disinterested generosity" test in favor of an
objective test of whether the payment was "to any substantial extent,
offset" by the value of the services received in return. 3'
The Internal Revenue Service has recently adopted the Oppewal
position in Revenue Ruling II 79-99.132 This Revenue Ruling deals with
payments to a church-related educational society that provided education
to the taxpayer's child. 133 The Revenue Ruling holds that the "taxpayer is
not entitled to a charitable contribution deduction since the taxpayer's
payments to the society do not exceed the fair market value of the child's
education."' 134 In reaching this conclusion the Internal Revenue Service
said, citing Oppewal:
However the payment is designated, and whatever the taxpayer's motive in
making it, the test to be applied is whether the payment was, to any substan-
tial extent, offset by the fair market value of services rendered to the taxpayer
in the nature of tuition. If so, the payment, to the extent of the offset, should
be regarded as nondeductible tuition.'35
128. Rev. Rul. 71-112, Id., is inconsistent with Rev. Rul. 70-15, 1970-1 C.B. 20. In Rev. Rul. 70-
15, the taxpayer purchased an annuity contract from a charity. The amount paid for the contract was in
excess of its fair market value at the time of purchase. The Revenue Ruling holds that "the amount
paid ... for the annuity in excess of its fair market value at the time of purchase is a charitable
contribution ... " Therefore, Rev. Rul. 70-15 holds that a mandatory "donation" that is considera-
tion for an annuity is deductible in part. See also Treas. Reg. 1.170A-I(d),T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106,
117.
129. See Rev. Ru!. 76-257, 1976-2 C.B. 52.
130. 468 F.2d 1000 (Ist Cir. 1972).
131. Id. at 1002.
132. 1979-1 C.B. 108. Legislation is now pending before Congress to prevent the enforcement of
this Revenue Ruling by the Internal Revenue Service. S. 1705, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S
11696 (1979). This legislation provides:
No amount paid to a corporation, community chest, fund, or foundation described in
subsection (c)(2) shall be denied treatment as a charitable contribution under subsection (a)
solely because of any educational benefit or other service received by the taxpayer or any
other person from such corporation, community chest, fund or foundation, or a related
organization, except to the extent that the payment is made subject to an express instruction
or designation, written or verbal, that the payment will be used or applied for the direct
benefit of the taxpayer or a member of his family.
133. The facts in this Revenue Ruling are virtually identical to those in DeJong v. Commission-
er, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962); Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Oppewal v.
Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); and Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D.
Mich. 1978).
134. 1979-1 C.B. 108, 109.
135. Id. at 108-09. Congress apparently does not, however, approve of the conclusions reached
by the Internal Revenue Service in Revenue Ruling 79-99, and has denied funds for its enforcement in
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Revenue Ruling 76-232136 contains the best statement of the Oppewal
approach. In this Revenue Ruling, the taxpayers participated in a weekend
marriage seminar conducted by a church. The taxpayers were not required
to pay a fee for the service, but were encouraged to donate to the organiza-
tion at the end of the weekend. The Revenue Ruling states:
If the transferor receives (or reasonably expects to receive) a financial benefit
that is commensurate with the money or property transferred, no deduction
under section 170 is allowable. . . .If the transferor receives (or reasonably
expects to receive) a financial benefit that is substantial but less than the
amount of the transfer, then the transaction may involve both a purchase and
a gift, and, assuming the requirements in that section are otherwise met, a
deduction under that section would be allowable for only the excess of the
amount transferred over the amount of the financial benefit received or
reasonably expected to be received by the transferor.1
37
This Revenue Ruling also holds that "the taxpayer is not entitled to a
charitable contribution deduction for any part of the donations made to
the charitable organization at the close of the weekend marriage seminar
unless the taxpayer establishes that the amount donated exceeded the
the Treasury, Postal Service and General Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 614,93
Stat. 576(1979). The prohibition of the Dornan Amendment to this Act applied only for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1980. Congress is now, however, considering extension of the Dornan Amend-
ment to the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981. H.R. 7583, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
Section 614 of the 1980 Appropriations Act (the "Dornan Amendment") provides that no funds
were appropriated
to carry out any revenue ruling of the Internal Revenue Service which rules that a taxpayer is
not entitled to a charitable deduction for general purpose contributions which are used for
educational purposes by a religious organization which is an exempt organization as des-
cribed in section 170 (c) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 614, 93 Stat. 576 (1979). The legislative history makes it clear that it was intended
to prohibit enforcement of Revenue Ruling 79-99. 125 Cong. Rec. H5975-6 (daily ed. July 16, 1979)
(remarks of Rep. Dornan).
The Dornan Amendment has created more confusion and uncertainty in an already confused
area. There are four judicial decisions on facts virtually identical to those of Revenue Ruling79-99, all
of which reach the same conclusion as that reached in the Revenue Ruling, although the analysis used
varies among the cases. See Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); Winters v.
Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962);
Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
The Dornan Amendment prohibits enforcement of Revenue Ruling 79-99 based directly on the
reasoning of one of the cases, Oppewal, but does not explicitly change the law upon which Oppewal
and the Revenue Rulings are based, nor does it expressly overrule Oppewal. Thus, it is unclear whether
Oppewal is still effective as a precedent. See Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency Enforce-
ment: The IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1381-83 (1980).
Assuming that the Dornan Amendment does overrule Oppewal, it provides no guidance about
whether the other cases that reach the same conclusion as Oppewal, but which employ different
reasoning, are also overruled. Thus Congress, by using the inappropriate and perhaps unconstitutional
device of refusing to appropriate funds for the enforcement of Revenue Ruling 79-99, see id. at 1381-86,
has thrown the law into chaos with respect to contributions to religious schools when a benefit is
received in return. Congress has told us that a different rule applies to contributions to religious
schools, but has not seen fit to change the statute to tell us what the rule is. Legislation was introduced
in 1979 to amend section 170 to allow deductions of the type denied in Oppeval and Revenue Ruling
79-99. S. 1075, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This Bill was not enacted, however. As a result, even the
congressional position on this issue appears hopelessly ambiguous.
136. 1976-1 C.B. 62.
137. Id. at 62.
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monetary value of all benefits and privileges received and that the amount
claimed as a charitable contribution is the amount of such excess."' 3 8
The Internal Revenue Service therefore has used each of the three
lines of reasoning in its Revenue Rulings. It has, however, never compared
the various tests it has used. It has merely adopted one or another of the
tests for purposes of the specific Revenue Ruling. The result is Revenue
Rulings that cannot be reconciled.
The high water mark of confusion was reached in Revenue Ruling 76-
185.'9 This ruling involves a taxpayer who paid for the restoration of a
historic mansion owned by a state. In return for restoring the mansion, the
taxpayer was given the right to live in it for 15 years. The ruling cites Singer
for the proposition that if the taxpayer receives benefits greater than those
that inure to the general public, no deduction is allowed. Then it cites
Oppewal for the proposition that if substantial benefits greater than those
that would inure to the general public are received by the donor, a
deduction is allowed measured by the difference between the monetary
value of what was given and the value of what was received. It also cited
DeJong and Transamerica Corporation for no apparent reason. Thus, in
one paragraph, the Internal Revenue Service not only adopts both the
Singer and Oppewal rationales, but also cites DeJong.140 The holding of
the Revenue Ruling, however, follows the Oppewal reasoning.
138. Id. It is interesting to note that although Rev. Rul. 76-232, 1976-1 C.B. 62 and Rev. Rul. 76-
257, 1976-2 C.B. 52 were published by the Internal Revenue Service less than one month apart, they
adopt reasoning that cannot be reconciled. Rev. Rul. 76-257 (published on June 21, 1976), discussed
above, deals with payments to a county for building roads. It adopts the Singer rationale that holds that
because the taxpayers receive "benefits substantially greater than those that would inure to the general
public" no deduction is allowed. Rev. Rul. 76-232 (published on July 12, 1976), on the other hand,
follows the Oppewal rationale and holds that even though the taxpayers receive a marriage renewal
seminar, which is clearly not a benefit that inures to the general public, part of the payment may be
deductible. But see note 135 supra, concerning the apparent congressional emasculation of Revenue
Ruling 79-99, 1979-I C.B. 108. In light of the similar underpinnings of both Revenue Ruling 76-232 and
Revenue Ruling 79-99-Oppeval-the continued viability of Ruling 76-232 may be in doubt. At the
very least, the congressional action described in note 135 adds more confusion to this area of tax law.
139. 1976-1 C.B. 60.
140. The ruling states, in pertinent part:
For purposes of section 170 of the Code, a contribution or gift is a voluntary transfer of
money or property made by the transferor without receipt or expectation of a financial or
economic benefit commensurate with the money or property transferred. See section 1. 170A-
I(c)(5) of the Income Tax Regulations; H.R. Rep. No. 1337 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. A44 (1954);
S. Rep. No. 1622,83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1954). If the transferor receives, or can reasonably
expect to receive, a financial or economic benefit that is commensurate with the money or
property transferred, no deduction under section 170 is allowable. United States v. Transa-
nerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968); Harris W. Seed, 57T.C. 265,278 (1971). Further,
if the transferor receives, or can reasonably expect to receive, sufficiently substantial benefits,
that is, benefits that are greater than those that would inure to the general public from a
transfer for charitable purposes, generally no deduction under section 170 is allowable.
Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971). However, if the transferor receives,
or can reasonably expect to receive, a financial or economic benefit that is substantial but less
than the amount of the transfer, then the transaction may involve both a purchase and a gift,
and a deduction under section 170 would only be allowable, assuming the requirements in
that section are otherwise met, for the excess of the amount transferred over the amount of
the financial or economic benefit received or reasonably expected to be received by the
transferor. Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); Harold DeJong, 36 T.C.
896, 899 (1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962). Id. at 60-61.
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The Letter Rulings of the Internal Revenue Service have been similar-
ly inconsistent. For example, one recent Letter Ruling141 follows the
Oppewal reasoning that denies the deduction only for amounts commen-
surate with the return benefit.142 On the other hand, another recent Letter
Ruling 43 holds, citing Singer, that if the donor receives any return benefits
greater than those that inure to the general public, the entire deduction will
be denied.'" Duberstein has not been cited in a Letter Ruling since 1971 .
Thus, both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have adopted
three different lines of reasoning in deciding charitable contribution de-
duction cases. Circuit courts have adopted one or another of the tests. The
Tax Court has been inconsistent as to what test to use. Moreover, the
Internal Revenue Service has enthusiastically adopted all three tests. The
law, therefore, is in a state of great confusion.
In view of the confused state of the law, the question arises as to
whether it is possible to reconcile the cases and Revenue Rulings. In the
cases and rulings, the courts and the Internal Revenue Service seem first to
determine whether a taxpayer has actually given up something and wheth-
er the charity has received anything of value. If there has been a transfer of
something of value, both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service
generally allow a deduction for the value of the economic benefit received
by the charity. If the charity does not receive an economic benefit, how-
ever, a deduction is denied. The result of allowing a deduction only for the
amount of the economic benefit received by the charity seems to be reached
141. Letter Ruling 8011036, Dec. 19, 1979.
142. Id. This Letter Ruling states:
A contribution or gift, for the purposes of section 170, is a voluntary transfer of money or
property made by the transferor without receipt or expectation of a financial benefit com-
mensurate with the money or property transferred. See section 1.170A-l(c)(5) of the regula-
tions, H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A44 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 196 (1954). If the transferor receives (or reasonably expects to receive) a financial benefit
that is commensurate with the money or property transferred, no deduction under section 170
is allowable. United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968); Seed v.
Comm'r, 57 T.C. 265,278 (1971). If the transferor receives (or reasonably expects to receive) a
financial benefit that is substantial but less than the amount of the transfer, then the
transaction may involve both a purchase and a gift and, assuming the requirements in that
section are otherwise met, a deduction under that section would be allowable only for the
excess of the amount transferred over the amount of the financial benefit received or
reasonably expected to be received by the transferor. Oppewal v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st
Cir. 1972); DeJong v. Comm'r, 30 T.C. 896, 899 (1961), aff d, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
143. Letter Ruling 7923064, Mar. 9, 1979; however, Letter Ruling 8006077, Oct. 19, 1979,
appears to adopt the Duberstein reasoning by citing DeJong for the proposition that:
[A] gift is generally defined as a voluntary transfer of property by the owner to another
without consideration. If a payment proceeds primarily from the incentive of anticipated
benefit to the payer beyond the satisfaction that flows from the performance of a generous
act, it is not a gift and is not deductible for federal income tax purposes.
144. This holding is inconsistent with Revenue Rulings allowing deductions when substantial
return benefits are received. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-232, 1976-1 C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B.
104.
145. Letter Ruling 7102040200A, Feb. 4, 1971. This Letter Rulingis essentially identical to Rev.
Rul. 71-269, note 120 supra.
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regardless of the type of analysis used. 146 Thus, the holdings of most of the
cases and rulings seem to be consistent.
The reasoning used to decide this type of case, however, has indeed
become a "mare's nest"' 47 partly because of the application of the Duber-
stein "detached and disinterested generosity" test. Duberstein is an income
exclusion case under what is now section 102 of the Internal Revenue
Code. There are compelling reasons for carefully scrutinizing the possible
disguise of compensation for services rendered as a gift. 48 Section 102(a)
of the Code allows taxpayers to exclude gifts from income. Compensation
for services is, of course, taxable income. 149 Therefore, taxpayers have a
strong incentive to classify a transfer as a gift rather than as compensation.
Accordingly, section 102 of the Code has been strictly construed by the
courts. 50 Although the legislative purpose of section 102 of the Code is not
entirely clear, 15' the courts have taken a restrictive attitude toward classify-
ing transfers as gifts and the "detached and disinterested generosity" test of
Duberstein reflects this restrictive attitude.
The charitable contribution deduction, on the other hand, is not an
income exclusion provision, but has quite different purposes from the gift
exclusion under section 102, and has not been strictly construed. The
charitable contribution deduction has been referred to as a "liberalization
of the law in the taxpayer's favor . . . begotten from motives of public
policy" and as a provision that is "not to be narrowly construed."',5 2 In
addition, the government benefits from charitable contributions because
private generosity helps provide services to the public that otherwise would
be provided by government. For example private donations support, in
whole or in part, worthwhile institutions such as hospitals and universities
that, absent private support, might have to rely upon greater amounts of
government aid. Also, private charity supports religious organizations
that could not be supported by the government because of constitutional
limitations.'53 Therefore, although the deduction for charitable contribu-
tions causes some revenue loss to the government, the persuasive reasons
for liberally construing section 170 do not exist in favor of section 102.
146. See, e.g., Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000(lst Cir. 1972); DeJongv. Commission-
er, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962); Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Rev. Rul. 79-
99, 1979-1 C.B. 108, see note 135 supra.
On virtually identical facts, these authorities reach virtually identical holdings, but adopt striking-
ly different methods of analysis to reach the holdings.
147. Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir. 1967); cert. denied 389
U.S. 976 (1967). See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
148. See note 72 and accompanying text, supra. See also Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 976 (1967); Haak v. United States, 451 F.
Supp. 1087 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
149. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).
150. See Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949).
151. See Klein, supra note 13.
152. Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 151 (1935).
153. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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Moreover, the Duberstein reasoning forces courts, and the Internal
Revenue Service, to try to see into the minds of donors to determine if all or
part of a transfer to a charity comes from "detached and disinterested gen-
erosity."'1 54 It is especially difficult to determine a person's motives when
a transfer is inspired both by generosity and by the expectation of a return
benefit, as in the situation where a parent transfers money to a school
attended by his or her child. Determination of a person's motives is even
more difficult when a transfer has been guided by skillful counsel aware of
the "detached and disinterested generosity" standards adopted by some
courts.
The Duberstein test can lead to anomalous results because many
transfers are, to a greater or lesser degree, motivated by selfish reasons. For
example, individuals or businesses may give to charities solely to enhance
their reputations by being listed as a "patron" of a symphony orchestra or
museum or by having a college building or scholarship fund named after
them. It is also common for people to attend charity balls or similar affairs
strictly for the social prestige and publicity to be gained from attending. In
addition, many people contribute to their churches because they believe
that they have a moral obligation to do so.
The Duberstein test, if strictly applied, can require the peculiar result
of allowing a deduction to one individual while denying it to another
whose behavior and economic detriment is identical to the first's. For
example, a person may buy a ticket, at higher than fair market value, for a
performance of a ballet sponsored by a charity. If he loves the ballet, feels
that the ticket is worth the cost because of the quality of the performance
and because of the social prestige of attending the event, but dislikes the
charity, he will be denied the deduction under the Duberstein reasoning
because he has no "detached and disinterested generosity." Another indi-
vidual, however, who buys a ticket to the same performance to support the
charity, but who dislikes the ballet and has no interest in the prestige of
attending, will be allowed the deduction for the excess of the amount paid
over the value of the performance because he has the necessary donative
intent. Thus, under the Duberstein reasoning, one person would be al-
lowed a deduction and another denied a deduction even though they both
154. See discussion of Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146 (Ist Cir. 1967)
cert. denied 389 U.S. 976 (1967), note 72 and accompanying text, supra. The Crosby Valve & Gage Co.
court pointed out that if the policy of the income tax law favoring charitable contributions is to be
effectively carried out, there is good reason to avoid unnecessary intrusion of subjective judgments as
to what prompts gifts to charities. The court predicted that if the subjective test of Duberstein is used in
charitable contribution cases "an important area of the tax law would become a mare's nest of
uncertainty woven of judicial value judgments irrelevant to eleemosynary reality." Id. at 146. In
addition, the "detached and disinterested generosity" test creates a difficult administrative burden in
that, literally applied, the Duberstein test would require the Internal Revenue Service to examine the
motives of all people or businesses that give to charity to determine if they have the necessary "detached
and disinterested generosity."
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suffered exactly the same economic detriment and the charity received the
same economic benefit. 155
The requirement that a gift be motivated by "detached and disinterest-
ed generosity" also creates serious problems with respect to charitable
contributions by corporations. While it is clear that corporations may
make deductible charitable contributions, 156 it is not clear that corpora-
tions may make gifts motivated by detached and disinterested generosity
without being ultra vires. This was pointed out in United States v. Trans-
america Corp.,57 where the court stated: "Further, an absolute require-
ment of detached and disinterested generosity or lack of any business
purpose would tend to render ultra vires substantially all charitable contri-
butions and thus to frustrate the congressional intent that corporations
should enjoy such deductions".158 Furthermore, the Tax Court in Dockery
v. Commissioner, specifically rejected the Duberstein rationale with this
statement: "[W]hile the Duberstein criteria may still hold validity with
respect to charitable contributions made by individuals . ..we believe
these criteria are inappropriate to determine if a business entity, such as a
corporation or partnership has made a charitable contribution entitling it
to a deduction under section 170. "16 Therefore, the requirement of "det-
ached and disinterested generosity," could cause disallowance of deduc-
tions for charitable contributions by businesses, a result clearly inconsist-
ent with the statute.' 6'
Additionally, the committee reports under what is now section 162(b),
the only legislative history that is pertinent, states that charitable contribu-
tions or gifts are "those contributions which are made with no expectation
155. Apparently, it is the position of the Internal Revenue Service that under these circumstan-
ces each purchaser should receive a deduction equal to the difference between the amount transferred
and the value of the benefit received in return, without regard to the intent of the donor. See Rev. Rul.
67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104. Another example of the strange results that would be reached by a literal
application of the Duberstein test would be that a person who gives all of his property to a charity
disliked by his heirs because he hates his heirs and wants them to inherit nothing would be denied
because he would not have the necessary "detached and disinterested generosity."
156. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2); United States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968);
Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F. 2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
157. 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968).
158. Id. at 524.
159. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 317 (1978).
160. Id. at 320-21. Thus the Tax Court apparently believes a different standard should apply to
charitable contributions by business entities than that applied to individuals. This distinction is wholly
unsupported by § 170, the Income Tax Regulations, legislative history and previous case law.
161. If, however, a payment to a charity by a corporation does not qualify as a deduction under
§ 170 because it was not made with "detached and disinterested generosity," it may nevertheless be
deductible under § 162(a) as an ordinary and necessary business expense. Section 162(b) limits the
business expense deduction to amounts that would be deductible as charitable contributions under
§ 170. A rigorous application of the Duberstein test to transfers by corporations and other businesses
to charities would result in no charitable contribution deduction being allowed because of a lack
of "detached and disinterested generosity." If payments by businesses to charities are not deductible
charitable contributions, a result the Duberstein test seems to require, they would be deductible under
§ 162(a) as ordinary and necessary business expenses without any limitation imposed by § 162(b).
Therefore, a rigorous and consistent application of the Duberstein test to transfers by businesses would
have the anomalous effect of making § 162(b) meaningless. See note 39 supra.
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of a financial return commensurate with the amount of the gift, '162 rather
than those made from particular generous motives. Thus, there is no
support in section 170, its legislative history or in the Income Tax Regula-
tions for use of the Duberstein "detached and disinterested generosity"
test.
In summary, there are clear reasons why the Duberstein test should
not be applied in charitable contribution cases. The Duberstein test is not
required by section 170 or the income tax regulations under section 170.
Duberstein was decided under section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code, a
section that has different purposes from section 170. Also, the Duberstein
analysis is inconsistent with corporate charitable contribution deductions
and with the only relevant legislative history. Therefore, it seems clear that
the Duberstein "detached and disinterested generosity" test should not
apply to charitable contribution deductions.
The Duberstein "detached and disinterested generosity" test gives no
clear guidance to taxpayers in planning charitable transfers, or to the
Internal Revenue Service and the courts in evaluating claimed charitable
deductions because it requires analysis of the taxpayers' subjective mo-
tives. Taxpayers have a right to a clear standard to determine their
deductions and the Internal Revenue Service and the courts need a clear
standard to use in deciding controversies. The Duberstein test, by its
subjective nature, can never provide a clear standard and should be aban-
doned.
The reasoning of Singer Co. v. United States,163 which allows no de-
duction if the donor receives a benefit greater than the benefit that would
inure to the general public because of a donation, can result in an inappro-
priate result. For example, few would deny that a two dollar deduction
should result if a person pays five dollars to his church for a dinner that is
only worth three dollars. 164 The dinner, however, is clearly a substantial
benefit that would not inure to a member of the general public who makes
a gift to the church. Under the Singer reasoning the receipt of the dinner
would eliminate the deduction.
The third line of reasoning that is applied to charitable contribution
cases is used by the First Circuit in Oppewal v. Commissioner, 65 Mason v.
162. H. R. REP. No. 1337,83rd Cong., 2d Sess., 44A, reprinted in [ 1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4013,4180; S. REP. No. 1622,83rd Cong., 2d Sess., 196, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4621, 4830-31. The language of these committee reports is reflected in Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-
1(c)(5), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106.
163. 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
164. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104. This Revenue Ruling states:
"As a general rule, where a transaction involving a payment is in the form of a purchase of an item
of value, the presumption arises that no gift has been made for charitable contribution purposes, the
presumption being that the payment in such case is the purchase price." Id. at 105. There is no support
in the law for the existence of this presumption. The burden of proof in litigation, however, would
generally be on the taxpayer to demonstrate that a deduction should be allowed. Tax Court Rule 142.
165. 468 F.2d 1000 (lst Cir. 1972).
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United States,6 6 and some Revenue Rulings. 167 Under this test an essen-
tially objective analysis is used without regard to the subjective question of
whether the donor acted from "detached and disinterested generosity."
This line of reasoning best reflects the purposes of the charitable contribu-
tion deduction because it allows a deduction for the value of the benefit to
the charity and the detriment to the donor, but it does not disallow a
deduction because the donor receives a return benefit. It is also administra-
tively feasible because it provides a clear, objective test to be used by
taxpayers, the Internal Revenue Service, and the courts.
IV. A PROPOSED TEST OF DEDUCTIBILITY
The Oppewal reasoning is a basic part of the proposed test. The
proposed test provides an objective method of determining whether there
is a deductible charitable contribution and its amount. It reflects the
holdings and the unarticulated reasoning of most of the cases and Revenue
Rulings, and is administratively feasible.
The first element of the test is that there must be an intent to make a
gift to a charity. This is consistent with the common law definition of gift
and appears to be required by section 170 as well, although it is not often
articulated in the cases or Revenue Rulings. 168 The intent would not,
however, be determined by the Duberstein "detached and disinterested
generosity" test. Rather, the required intent would be simply the intent that
the taxpayer give up something of value and that the charity receive
something of value. The taxpayer's motives beyond whether there was an
intent to confer a benefit on the charity would be irrelevant.
A threshold determination that there was an intent to make a gift is
necessary in order to avoid the allowance of a deduction for what is, in
reality, a bad business bargain between the taxpayer and a charity. For
example, in Rusoff v. Commissioner,169 the taxpayers transferred patent
interests to Columbia University in exchange for royalties arising from the
patent. The transaction did not produce the astronomical profits expected
and the taxpayers attempted to treat the transfers as a bargain sale,
deducting part of the value of the patent interests. The Tax Court held that
the taxpayers "expected to receive, directly and indirectly, financial bene-
fits fully commensurate with the value of the property transferred.' 70
Accordingly, Rusoff held that a transfer that was, in effect, a business
transaction that failed to produce a profit could not be characterized as a
166. 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975).
167. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
168. While not often articulated, a conclusion that there was no intent to make a gratuitous
transfer appears to underlie many decisions when all deductions are denied. See, e.g.,, Marquis v.
Commissioner, 49 T.C. 695 (1968).
169. 65 T.C. 459 (1975).
170. Id. at 469.
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deductible charitable contribution. In other words, there was no intent to
confer a benefit on the university. 71
Second, after it has been determined that there has been a transfer
with the intent to benefit the charity, it is necessary to determine if the
transferor received or expected to receive a benefit in return for the
transfer. If the transferor receives no benefit or a benefit that is incidental,
the deduction will be allowed for the full value of the transferred pro-
perty. 172 Thus, in the typical situation if a person contributes money to his
church or college, a deduction is allowed for the entire amount because
only incidental benefits are received in return.
The third and last step in the analysis of a charitable contribution is
the determination whether the transferor receives a benefit that is greater
than an incidental benefit, that is, a "substantial" or "direct" benefit, 173 as
opposed to an "incidental" benefit. 7 4 If the benefit received in return is
commensurate with the value transferred the deduction will be denied in its
entirety.175 Denial of the deduction if the donor receives a commensurate
return benefit is consistent with the purposes of section 170 because the
charity receives no economic benefit and the taxpayer suffers no economic
detriment.1 76 For example, if a taxpayer purchases a book worth twenty-
five dollars for twenty-five dollars from a charity, he is no poorer. His
171. It seems clear that the same result would be reached if a taxpayer sold property to a charity
(for example, land to a hospital) for less than its fair market value because of mistake, poorjudgment,
or inadvertence. There would be no gift for § 170 purposes, because the intent of the transfer was not to
confer a benefit on the charity and a deduction would therefore be denied.
Similarly, a transfer made in the ordinary course of business at arm's length and free from any
donative intent is not considered a taxable gift, for gift tax purposes, even if the property transferred
was worth more than the benefit received in return by the transferor. See Treas. Reg. 25.2512-8 (1958).
The requirement that there be an intent to confer a benefit on the charity is shown by the cases which
hold that a deduction is to be denied if the transferor expects to receive a financial benefit commensu-
rate with the money or property transferred. See Rusoff v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 459 (1975);
Grinslade v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 566 (1973). See also Dowell v. United States, 553 F.2d 1233 (9th
Cir. 1977); Collman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1975); Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d
885 (9th Cir. 1970).
172. Generally, the satisfaction that flows from a generous act is defined as an incidental benefit
that will not reduce or eliminate the charitable deduction. See, e.g., Knott v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.
681 (1977). Also, benefits that all members of the public, including the donor, share are incidental
benefits. See Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
Accordingly, a taxpayer who transfers land to a city for use as a park will not be denied a
deduction because he, as well as the rest of the public, may use it. Similarly, a donor who gives money to
a hospital will not be denied a deduction because he, as well as the rest of the public benefits from
improved health care. See generally id.
173. See Collman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1975); Murphyv. Commissioner, 54
T.C. 249 (1970).
174. See Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 900 (W.D.S.C. 1965); Sutton v.
Commissioner, 57 T.C. 239 (1971); Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104.
175. See Sedam v. United States, 518 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 962 (1976); Grinslade v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 566 (1973).
176. This conclusion is also consistent with the definitions of charitable contributions contained
in the legislative history of § 162(b). H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., A44, reprinted in [1954]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4013, 4120; S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., 196, reprinted in
[1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4830-31.
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wealth has merely changed form from cash to a book. Similarly, the
charity is no richer. Its wealth has merely changed form from a book to
cash. The fact that the charity may make a profit on the sale of the book
does not alter this fact.
77
If the transferor receives a return benefit that is substantial or direct,
but which is not commensurate with the value transferred, a deduction will
be allowed for the difference between the value of the amount transferred
and the value of the benefit received. 178 Once again, this result is consistent
with the purposes of section 170. In this situation, the taxpayer has given
up an economic benefit, and the charity has received an economic benefit.
It is appropriate, therefore, that the taxpayer be allowed a deduction for
the amount of his economic detriment.1
7 9
The approach to charitable contribution deductions outlined in this
Article appears to be the actual, unarticulated reasoning used by the courts
in almost all cases and by the Internal Revenue Service in almost all
Revenue Rulings. The cases of DeJong v. Commissioner,180 Oppewal v.
Commissioner,18' Haak v. United States, 1 2 and Revenue Ruling 79-99183
represent the most striking examples of the divergent reasoning used to
reach similar results. In these cases, and in the Revenue Ruling, the facts
and the holdings are virtually identical, but the rationales leading to the
holdings are inconsistent. Use of the test suggested would enable a court to
reach the same conclusion as those reached in the cases and in the Revenue
Ruling, but would make clear the real reasoning behind the conclusions.
The test would also eliminate the necessity of delving into whether a
transfer was motivated by "detached and disinterested generosity." Adop-
tion of the test suggested would thus not only eliminate much of the
confusion in this area of the law but also would be consistent with the
purposes of section 170.
177. See Rusoff v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 459 (1975).
178. See Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d I000 (Ist Cir. 1972); DeJong v. Commissioner,
309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962); Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Rev. Rul.
79-99, 1979-1 C.B. 108, see note 135, supra; Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
179. In most situations the detriment to the donor and the benefit to the charity will be equal in
value. For example, ifa person pays $5.00 to his church, the detriment to the donor and the benefit to
the church are both $5.00. The benefit to the charity and the detriment to the donor may not, however,
always be the same. For example, a church may collect handguns that it will destroy with the hope of
reducing violence. The detriment to the donor, assuming no substantial return benefit, will be the fair
market value of a donated handgun. It could be argued, however, that there is no economic benefit to
the church. In such a case it seems reasonable that the deduction should be the amount of the donor's
detriment, since it is the donor's tax situation that is affected by the transfer, and because of the policy
of encouraging charitable contributions.
180. 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
181. 468 F.2d 1000 (Ist Cir. 1972).
182. 451 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
183. 1979-1 C.B. 108. See note 135, supra.
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